Over the past weeks, a lot of accusations
have been thrown around regarding the conflict in the Kivus. Let's take a closer
look at some of them:
The M23 rebellion is the result of the
international community pressing for Bosco Ntaganda's arrest.
Not
really. The real reason behind the M23 mutiny/rebellion is Kinshasa's desire to
get rid of the ex-CNDP parallel chains of command in the Kivus. The CNDP - Gen.
Laurent Nkunda's armed group - had been integrated into the Congolese army in
2009 through a deal brokered by the Rwandan government. That deal proved
providential for the ex-CNDP, as they received top positions in the operational
command, with around 20 per cent of senior positions in South Kivu (I don't have
figures for North Kivu), along with control over smuggling and taxation rackets
(often in complicity with non-CNDP). Other, non-CNDP officers were resentful of
this arrangement and have been sending signals since at least last year that
they want to break up these ex-CNDP networks. So when pressure piled up in March
to arrest Bosco it provided the trigger, but not the underlying cause, for the
mutiny.
(Another myth is that Kabila called for Bosco's arrest in April
in Goma. He said, in Swahili: "There are a hundred reasons why we could arrest
him," but never explicitly called for his arrest. Since then, however, the
governor of North Kivu has called for his arrest.)
The M23 rebellion
was formed because Kinshasa had not lived up to its end of the March 23, 2009
agreement.
This is a bit disingenuous. The M23 are called thus
because they claim that all they want is the March 23, 2009 agreement with the
Kinshasa government to be implemented. (As a reminder, here and here are
the terms of the deal.) It is true that there were shortcomings - more could be
done to promote the repatriation of Congolese refugees from Rwanda, although the
issue is complex. There certainly were tensions and insults traded between
ex-CNDP and other FARDC commanders, and the implementation committee had not met
in many months.
But to say that the ex-CNDP did not receive their proper
salaries is a bit rich, given that many ex-CNDP officers benefited royally from
their deployments to mining areas and their control over smuggling rackets.
Bosco in particular became rich through smuggling minerals across the border;
his men even burglarized banks in Goma in broad daylight.
As for the
operations against the FDLR, which the M23 claim had been insufficient, the past
three years had seen major advances. According to the UN, 4,914 FDLR combatants
returned home via MONUSCO between 2009 and February 2012, with almost as many
dependents. That could be anywhere between 50 and 75 per cent of all FDLR
troops, although it does not account for fresh recruitment and the original
estimates for the FDLR strength may have been slightly off.
In addition,
the Congolese government has continued to allow a Rwandan special forces company
of around 200 soldiers to maintain a base in the eastern Congo (bizarrely, until
today) and conduct operations against the FDLR. These, again, have been very
successful (although often at a great humanitarian cost) - with their help, the
FDLR Chief of Staff Col. Mugaragu was killed, as were the influential battalion
commander Col. Kanzeguhera (aka Sadiki Soleil) and several other important
officers.
There were certainly problems with the integration of the
ex-CNDP and insincerity on both sides. But those problems should have been
solved at the negotiation table, not on the battlefield.
Allegations
of anti-Tutsi discrimination are just a pretext for Rwandan
meddling.
Slow down, this isn't quite so simple. There is no doubt
that deep resentment and prejudice persists against the Tutsi community in the
eastern Congo. And there have been many incidents of abuse against Tutsi
civilians and soldiers over the past years, ranging from summary execution to
torture and hate speech. All communities in the eastern Congo have experienced
abuse, but the Tutsi perception of discrimination is accentuated given their
particular history. This fear and ethnic solidarity is very real.
But
allegations of anti-Tutsi discrimination are not always well-founded and have at
times been manipulated. Since the mutiny began, there have been accusations of
anti-rwandophone attacks, particular in Masisi. While there have not been
exhaustive investigations, the UN and international NGOs have looked into these
allegations by sending teams to the field and have not been able to to find
proof of systematic abuse (there appear to have been isolated cases of rape and
murder, which are reprehensible, but not widespread). In particular, the allegation
voiced both by the Rwandan government and the M23 that 43 ex-CNDP Tutsi were
killed in Dungu during anti-LRA operations has not been corroborated by either
Congolese civil society or international NGOs based there. There have indeed
been Tutsi and Hutu civilians arrested by the Congolese army and intelligence
services under suspicion of collaboration with M23, and some of these civilians
may have been beaten. Investigations are ongoing.
It is worthwhile
pointing out that many of the units deployed against the M23 in the
Mushaki-Kilolirwe part of Masisi were initially from the 601st battalion, which
included many Tutsi and Hema officers at the company level. Also, the sector
commander who took over from the M23 in Masisi is Col. Innocent Kabundi, a Tutsi
himself from Masisi, and many of the staff officers commanding operations in
North Kivu are Tutsi (Col. Jonas Padiri, Col. Innocent Gahizi, Col. Aaron
Nyamushebwa, etc.).
The US government delayed the UN Group of
Expert's report from being published.
Yes, although the US government
was divided on this matter. According to several sources within the State
Department - in Washington, Rwanda and the Congo - the outlier was Ambassador
Susan Rice, the US Permananent Representative to the United Nations. She
had some misgivings about the information in the report and especially whether
this was the best way to air these allegations, thinking it would be best to
address this behind closed doors to avoid an escalation. Almost everybody else
in the State Department, including the embassies in the field, as well as
Assistant Secretary of State Johnnie Carson, agreed that the addendum to the
report should be published.
The Congolese army is collaborating with
the FDLR in their offensive against the M23.
This is an allegation to
Rwandan government has made, largely in private. There is no hard proof so far
to substantiate this. The most serious claim was the visit of FDLR Col.
Pacifique Ntawunguka (aka Omega) to Goma in May, allegedly to meet with
Congolese Gen. Didier Etumba and to receive money to fight the M23. Other
allegations have been made of suspicious troop movements toward the front in
Runyoni. Also, this past week an FDLR delegation visited Goma from Brussels, as
reported in Rwandan newspapers. According to several sources in Goma, this
delegation had been organized by a Norwegian NGO to help sensitize the FDLR, but
were arrested by the Congolese army once they were there. It is not clear
whether there was some ulterior motive to their visit.
While the
Congolese army has collaborated with the FDLR in the past - most recently in
2008 - there has not yet been independent verification of any systematic
collaboration against the M23.
The M23 mutiny is not the most serious
conflict in the east; we should focus our attention elsewhere.
Yes,
while the M23 has the most significant geopolitical implications, the most
serious humanitarian situation in April and May was the fighting between Raia
Mutomboki along the border between North and South Kivu. Hundreds have been
killed there since late last year and tens of thousands displaced. The Rwandan
government has pointed this out, suggesting that we should focus our attention
there.
But here, again, it may well be more complicated. Some of the
armed groups active there - in particular the Forces pour le défense du
Congo (FDC) and Sheka Ntaberi's Nduma Defense of Congo (NDC) - have direct
ties with Bosco Ntaganda and perhaps even Kigali (see the Group of Experts'
report here).
There are now allegations, which have not been substantiated, coming from civil
society and the Congolese government, that similar ties exist with the Raia
Mutomboki. That would be strange, given the extreme anti-rwandophone bent to the
group, but these kinds of alliance contre nature have popped up
previously.
Source: Congo Siasa Blog, Sunday, July 1, 2012
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