Executive Summary
On March 31,
indicted war criminal and rebel leader turned Congolese General Bosco
“The Terminator”
Ntaganda launched a rebellion against the Congolese state while facing the
threat of arrest and prosecution for war crimes under international and Congolese
criminal law.
Ntaganda’s
unexpected defection followed soon after the conviction of his former rebel ally,
Thomas Lubanga, for the recruitment of child soldiers by the International Criminal Court,
or ICC. This conviction, coupled with a weakened Congolese government grasping for
international legitimacy in the wake of fraudulent presidential elections,
sparked renewed international pressure for the arrest of Ntaganda and his deliverance to
the ICC on similar charges.
Upwards of 600
soldiers and senior-level commanders loyal to Ntaganda defected with him,
causing the unstable Kivu region of eastern Congo to brace for the worst.
Those
commanders and rank and file who are loyal to him must choose between mutiny and
loyalty to the state.
These recent
events on the ground have presented an opportunity for the Congolese state to
finally take action to arrest Ntaganda and deliver him to justice. Ntaganda’s
continued presence as a
warlord/general is a fundamental impediment to progress on the
interconnected
issues of democratization, security sector reform, justice sector reform, and mineral
sector reform in Congo.
In order for
this situation to result in a positive outcome, the Enough Project calls on the U.S. government
and other donor nations to:
• Support and
pressure the governments of Congo and Rwanda, to the fullest extent possible, to
arrest Bosco Ntaganda and the senior commanders who defected with him and deliver
them to justice.
• Urge the
establishment of the Specialized Mixed-Courts system, which has been provided for by
the Congolese government to try individuals charged with war crimes and crimes
against humanity in Congo.
• Pressure the
government of Congo to implement security-sector reform. This should include a focus
on increasing civilian protection in areas most vulnerable to local militia
movements and military operations; supporting the professionalization of Congolese
troops; and establishing a credible method of payment for troops.
• Assert to the
governments of Congo and Rwanda that Bosco is bad for business.
Significant
progress has been made in the region over the past three years in transforming the conflict
minerals trade, as Rwanda and Congo have recognized that they benefit from a
stable and legitimate minerals business. Ntaganda now threatens to put this progress
at risk, as no company will invest in minerals from rebel-held territories.
Introduction
On March 31,
indicted war criminal and rebel leader turned Congolese General Bosco “The Terminator”
Ntaganda launched a rebellion against the Congolese state while facing the
threat of arrest and prosecution for war crimes under international and Congolese
criminal law.
The rebellion
began when Ntaganda organized a defection of a significant number of troops loyal to
his command. A majority of them belonged to the rebel group he previously commanded, the
National Congress for the Defense of the People, or CNDP, an
ethnic Tutsi
group with strong links to the Rwandan government.
The defections
coincided with the recent conviction at the ICC of Ntaganda’s former ally and
commander Thomas Lubanga for war crimes and recruitment of child soldiers.
Lubanga’s
conviction, coupled with the state of a weakened Congolese government grasping for
legitimacy in the wake of recently fraudulent presidential elections, sparked renewed
international pressure for the arrest of Ntaganda and his deliverance to the
ICC.
In reaction to
Ntaganda’s defection, upwards of 600 soldiers and senior-level commanders loyal to him
defected as well, causing the unstable Kivu region of eastern Congo to brace for
the worst. At the outset of the rebellion, it appeared that the region could potentially
spiral into large-scale violence. Ntaganda and his loyalists secured their positions to
the north and west of the North Kivu capital Goma, between the areas of Rutshuru and
Masisi. Meanwhile Congolese national army, or FARDC, elements—
including
reinforcements deployed from Kasaï Occidental and Maniema provinces—took up
defensive positions in Goma and the South Kivu capital Bukavu.
Recent progress
that had been made by a joint United Nations Mission to the Congo, or MONUSCO, and
FARDC operation to dismantle other local armed rebel groups. These military
operations focused heavily on the notorious Rwandan-linked Hutu rebel group known as the
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda, or FDLR. Operations against the
FDLR were weakened as FARDC’s defecting forces pulled back from positions aimed
at diminishing FDLR ranks and influence. This dynamic continues,
enabling the
FDLR and its allies to regroup and rearm.
In response to
the mutiny and the increased instability, Congolese President Joseph Kabila
dispatched a high-profile delegation from the national army, along with
hundreds of additional
troops, to Goma to wrest control of the situation and prevent any further desertions.
Shortly thereafter President Kabila himself traveled to Goma in an
unprecedented move to attempt
to defuse the situation. Speaking publicly in Goma, Kabila ambiguously
signaled that he was considering the arrest of Ntaganda and that there were “hundreds of
reasons” to arrest him.
Both the
presidential visit and the show of force were important signals that there had
been a shift in the
Kabila regime’s strategy for dealing with the notoriously divisive and
destabilizing
Ntaganda.
Previously the government believed that co-opting and cooperating with Ntaganda were
necessary to maintain stability in the region. This theory supported the 2009 peace
process that paved the way for the CNDP to be folded into the national army.
By 2012 the
government had come to perceive Ntaganda as a liability, not only for Kinshasa and Kigali,
Rwanda, but even to many in his CNDP party. For Kabila, it is an opportunity to take
significant step forward to establishing justice in Congo. For the
international community, this shift is
seen as an opportunity to arrest one of the most heinous war criminals in the world, and
set a renewed precedent for international criminal justice.
Who is Bosco Ntaganda?
Bosco Ntaganda,
39, was born in Kinigi, Rwanda but fled to eastern Congo as a teenager
following attacks on Tutsis in Rwanda. He got his start fighting alongside the Rwandan
Patriotic Army, or RPA, in the early 1990s and took part in the RPA’s overthrow of the Rwandan
government’s genocidal regime in 1994. Following the genocide and the shift
in power to the new Tutsi-led government of Rwanda, Ntaganda joined the
Rwandan army, or RPF.
As a
rank-and-file soldier he took part in the 1996 invasion of Congo in an effort
to root out remaining
Hutu militant remnants existing in refugee camps in the eastern portion of the country.
In 1998, as a second round of conflict broke out in eastern Congo,
Ntaganda joined
a Rwandan-backed rebel group in Congo called the Congolese Rally for Democracy,
or RCD.
This led to a
series of involvements with Rwandan-backed rebel movements in eastern Congo seeking
to establish Rwandaphone control of the region, its resources, and its people. In 2002
Ntaganda served under ICC-indicted war criminal Thomas Lubanga as chief of
military operations for the Union of Congolese Patriots, or UPC, and was connected to
several instances of massive human rights abuses including conscription of child soldiers,
murder, rape, and torture.
In 2006
Ntaganda left the UPC and became the military chief of staff for the CNDP, at that time
under the command of the notorious leader Laurent Nkunda. During this period the
CNDP, backed by Rwanda, controlled most of the territory in eastern Congo.
In 2009,
following a still-secret rapprochement between President Kabila and President Paul Kagame of
Rwanda, Nkunda was seized by the Rwandan government and placed under house
arrest in Rwanda. Ntaganda was given control of the CNDP, and the group
was to be
subsumed into the Congolese armed forces with Ntaganda receiving the rank of general
and the deputy command of military operations in eastern Congo. In this position,
he served as a shield for an alleged Rwandan opposition building up in eastern Congo
with former President Kagame’s right-hand men, exiled generals Faustin Kayumba,
Patrick Karegeya, and others.
Since this
period Ntaganda has used his position to run a parallel command structure within the
FARDC to consolidate the power of Rwandaphone commanders and stakeholders in the region.
This network run by Ntaganda has engaged in unprecedented exploitation of
minerals in the region through the militarization of eastern Congo’s largest mine sites to
amass personal wealth for himself and his followers. They have forced Congolese Hutu
and Hunde off their land to expand control of grazing areas for Tutsi
loyalists and
have practiced years of intimidation, torture, rape, and assassination to keep
communities fractured and obedient.
Implications of the Terminator’s mutiny
Recent events
present a good opportunity for the Congolese government to finally take action to
arrest Ntaganda and deliver him to justice. It is unlikely that Bosco would be able to turn
back the clock, return to the FARDC, and resume his position as commander of military
operations in eastern Congo. Those officers and rank and file who are loyal to him
now have to choose between mutiny and loyalty to the state.
This rift
within the military structure has created a seismic shift in the security
landscape of eastern
Congo. Its implications will resonate across security, justice, and mineral
sectors and
must be addressed in order to seize the opportunity to rid the region of Ntaganda and to
attempt to advance positive reforms in the region. Motivated by regional
security, the Kabila-Kagame-Ntaganda arrangement was ineffectual before the
Civilian
protection: Ntaganda’s mutiny and subsequent
consolidation of power in Masisi created
widespread anxiety in the region about renewed conflict between Rwandaphone elements loyal
to Ntaganda and the FARDC. Further, the defection situation allowed other rebel
groups, especially the FDLR, to expand their presence in the region,
particularly around Masisi
in North Kivu. The decrease in pressure from the highly successful FARDC and
MONUSCO joint operations has raised morale within the FDLR.
This tension as
Bosco also rebuilds in Masisi and the expansion of the FDLR in both North and South
Kivu is extremely problematic for vulnerable communities in areas where these
groups operate. These armed groups prey upon civilian populations to get resources and
force loyalty. Should full-on conflict erupt, it will be these populations that suffer
most. Protection of the most vulnerable communities must be a priority for the FARDC and
MONUSCO.
Security
sector reform: Since Ntaganda’s mutiny, President Kabila
and the FARDC have suspended the
joint military operations, known as Amani Leo, which Ntaganda led. In recent years,
this operation provided cover for Ntaganda and his forces for much of the exploitation of
land and resources in the region and resulted in numerous incidents of gross human
rights violations.
President
Kabila and the FARDC now have an opportunity to wrest control of the military operations in
the east and eliminate command structures that favor ethnic backgrounds or
tribal/regional affiliations. It is promising that a military tribunal has been
established in Goma to try
mutineers who have returned to the FARDC. Moving forward, it is critical that a single
chain of command is instituted, that mutineers are tried in a fair and
transparent manner, and
that there is a shift toward professionalism of the armed forces with a focus on paying
troops and protecting civilians against armed militias.
Justice
sector reform: As long as Ntaganda is allowed to move
freely in eastern Congo, corruption, intimidation,
and impunity will continue to shape the political, economic, and security
landscape. The justice sector—both civilian and military—is in a shambles, and there are
systemic obstacles in terms of resources, capacity, infrastructure, and
political will that must
be addressed for sustainable reform if the Congolese justice system is to improve.
However, a show of force from the Congolese government to arrest Ntaganda and deliver him
to justice could have a tremendous impact on advancing reform in Congo.
Further, it is
critical that mechanisms to try such a case be put in place so that in the
future the state is
able to credibly detain and try those accused of serious crimes.
Mineral
sector reform: Over the past year, significant progress
has been made in demilitarizing mining sites in
Congo’s eastern provinces. While considerable work remains to be done, a
series of initiatives the Congolese government took to push militia groups out of mines and wrest
control of some of largest mine sites in the Kivus has met with some success. These
initiatives have been backed by an array of international stakeholders, 6
The Enough Project • www.enoughproject.org | Taking the Terminator including
regional and international governments, as well as multinational corporations interested in
increasing investment and development in the region. There appears to be a willingness
from those actors to work with community, business, and political leaders in Congo to
develop shared value through the establishment of free and fair markets in eastern Congo.
Any continuing involvement of Ntaganda in the minerals sector jeopardizes this progress
and would sustain one of the key drivers of conflict in the region.
Bosco Ntaganda’s
mutiny provides an important opportunity for the Congolese government and
international actors to take positive steps toward peace and reform in eastern Congo. This
turn of events presents the possibility that, finally, the interconnected issues of
democratization, security sector reform, justice sector reform, and mineral
sector reform might be
addressed in conjunction with each other. Therefore, the Enough Project
recommends that the U.S. government and partner donor nations:
• Support and pressure
the governments of Congo and Rwanda, to the fullest extent possible, to
arrest Bosco Ntaganda and the senior commanders who defected with him and deliver
them to justice.
• Urge the
establishment of the Specialized Mixed-Courts system to try war crimes and crimes against
humanity in Congo.
• Pressure the
government of Congo to implement security-sector reform. This should include a focus
on increasing civilian protection in areas most vulnerable to local militia
movements and military operations, supporting the professionalization of Congolese
troops, and establishing a credible method for payment for troops.
• Assert to the
governments of Congo and Rwanda that Bosco is bad for business.
Significant
progress has been made in the region over the past three years in transforming the conflict
minerals trade, as Rwanda and Congo have recognized that they benefit from a
stable and legitimate minerals business. Ntaganda now threatens to put this progress
at risk, as no company will invest in minerals from rebel-held territories.
Enough
is a project of the Center for American Progress to end genocide and crimes
against humanity.
Founded in 2007, Enough focuses on the crises in Sudan, South Sudan, eastern Congo,
and areas affected by the Lord’s Resistance Army. Enough conducts intensive
field research,
develops practical policies to address these crises, and shares sensible tools
to empower
citizens and groups working for change.
Source: www.enoughproject.org.,May 2012
Author: Aaron Hall
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