The UN Group of Experts on the DR Congo submitted the celebrated addendum to its interim report yesterday. The addendum (apparently the correct terminology) is due to be published later today or tomorrow, but, Security Council politics being what they are, leaked copies are already circulating. I have obtained one; here is a summary and a brief analysis.
The report deals
exclusively with Rwandan support to armed groups and sanctioned individuals in
the eastern Congo, and the findings are extremely damning. The Group finds that
Rwanda is providing extensive support not just to the M23 rebellion, but to six
other armed groups in the eastern Congo. Some of the support allegedly dates
back to last year, although most of Rwanda's early involvement was aimed at
assassinating individual FDLR leaders, using proxy militia such as Sheka
Ntaberi's NDC or the FDC (aka "Les Guides"). At some point, however, Rwanda's
aims changed, and they began backing groups that opposed the Congolese
government. These included the M23, but also include a new coalition of armed
groups in Ituri, an abortive mutiny in Bukavu, the irredentist former governor
of South Kivu (Chiribanya) and a local militia in Masisi. This attempt to build
a cross-regional coalition is reminiscent of Nkunda's CNDP, that was always
trying to break out of the Kinyarwanda-speaking community and rally other
communities and leaders to its cause.
However, most of
these other groups are either barely alive or not (yet) very important. As in
the case with the CNDP, the outreach efforts have not gained much traction. The
main group is still the M23.
But when it comes to
the M23, the allegations are hard-hitting. The support they document consists of
providing ammunition and guns, health care, training, and new recruits. They
also provide details of meetings organized by top Rwandan officials, including
senior defense ministry representatives, to mobilize Congolese business and
politicians to join M23. They claim that the Rwandan government has used its
demobilization commission networks to mobilize ex-combatants, many of whom used
to fight in the FDLR, as well as allowing recruitment to happen in the refugee
camps largely populated by Congolese Tutsi. Most egregiously, they report that
Rwanda has sent its own army into the Congo to support the mutiny on several
occasions.
The Group names
individuals within the Rwandan government by name, saying that the following
people played key roles: Defense Minister General James Kabarebe, the Defense
Forces Chief of Staff General Charles Kayonga, the Permanent Secretary of the
ministry of Defense General Jack Nziza, and Rwandan army division commander
General Emmanuel Ruvusha. These officers have attended mobilization meetings,
been in direct contact with mutineers, and have been seen organizing logistical
support to the M23.
On the M23 side,
besides Col. Sultani Makenga and Gen. Bosco Ntaganda, Laurent Nkunda is making a
reappearance in M23 meetings and mobilization. The Group has also found that
Rwanda is supporting individuals – Gen. Ntaganda, Col. Zimurinda and Sheka – who
are on the UN sanctions list.
The Rwandan
government has already attacked the Group's methodology, so it is worth saying a
few words about who they are and what standards they use.
The Group consists of
six experts: Steve Hege (USA, coordinator and armed groups expert), Marie
Plamadiala (Moldova, customs and aviation), Ruben de Koenig (Netherlands,
natural resources), Steven Spittaels (Belgium, finance), Nelson Alusala (Kenya,
arms), and Emilie Serralta (France, regional issues). Most of them - like Hege,
who is a former MONUC official and has worked for Jesuit Refugee Service and
Refugee International in the region - have spent over five years working on the
region.
The Group usually
requires three independent and reliable sources to make a claim. In this case,
however, given the severity and importance of the allegations, they say they
rely on at least five such sources. Most of the evidence is eye-witness
testimony - they interviewed 80 deserters from these various armed groups,
including 31 Rwandan nationals, along with senior Congolese army and
intelligence officers and active members of the various armed groups. They have
some documentary evidence, including internal Congolese army reports and radio
intercepts, as well as pictures of M23 weapons and ammo that are not in
Congolese army stocks.
In other words, there
is extensive evidence of systematic Rwandan intervention in the DRC in violation
of the UN sanctions regime, not to mention of Congolese sovereignty. Many
questions, however, remain open: Why is Rwanda doing this? What is their
ultimate goal? When did they decide to back these rebellions? What will the
international community, which provides almost half of Rwanda's budget -
including military cooperation and support to the demobilization commission -
do? And what will the Rwandan reaction be, given that donors have invested
billions in successful development projects, and Rwanda provides much-needed
troops to the African Union mission in Darfur?
Source: Congo Siasa,
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